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Abstract  
To what extent has the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) been 
effective? How has it evolved? And has it been implemented in accordance to the 
original plan? These are the questions that motivate this research. Having 
conducted a policy analysis on the policy process of the EU ETS I have found that 
the policy, in its first and second phase of implementation, have been skewed by 
member states, to fit their own interests, on behalf of the effectiveness with 
which the policy abates greenhouse gas emission. However, these policy-flaws 
have been mitigated in the revision of the policy’s third phase. The goal of the 
two first phases of the policy was also more than emission reductions, it was to 
create trial period for establishing the EU ETS before the launch of the global 
emission market in 2008. This, the EU was successful in doing, constructing the 
basic infrastructure the complex emission market and creating valuable 
experience for the phases to come.     
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Introduction 
 
Why is the EU Emission Trading Scheme important? 
At the present moment the human race has a staggering energy consumption of 
4,1 x 1020 joules a year. If converted into Mars bar units this corresponds to an 
overwhelming daily consumption of 167.5141 Mars bars pr. person all year round 
or an aggregated yearly consumption of 90.000 billion litres of oil. Most of this 
energy comes from oil, coal or gas (Coley; 2011, 1).  
 
During the last century, as human societies have become ever more dependent 
on this energy input, the fossil energy sources have become increasingly 
exhausted. At the same time, fossil fuel consumption has pushed the carbon 
cycle of our planet off balance, by massively over-loading the carbon sinks2. As 
greenhouse gasses are not absorbed they are now filling up our atmosphere, 
encapsulating the thermal energy of sunrays, shifting the patterns of our climate.   
 
Following the resent report from World Energy Outlook, the world is failing in the 
effort to transform energy systems to renewable resources and hereby reduce 
greenhouse gas emission and mitigate climate change effectively (IEA, 2012, p. 
23). In their projection of current policies, the emissions will result in an average 
increase of 3.6°C within this century, which is 1.6 degrees higher than the goal of 
keeping the human impact on climatic fluctuations on a secure and tolerable 
level.  A swift transition to a steeply declining emission level is a prerequisite for 
contributing to the global climate goal of keeping the temperature rise under 2°C. 
Following World Energy Outlook;   
 
“Almost four-fifths of the CO2 emissions allowable by 2035 are already locked-in 
by existing power plants, factories, buildings, etc. If action to reduce CO2 
emissions is not taken before 2017, all the allowable CO2 emissions would be 
locked-in by energy infrastructure existing at that time” (ibid. p. 26).   
 
So time pressure for establishing sustainable societies is the most central element 
of the climate change problem. Furthermore, the longer the advancement away 
from fossil fuels is postponed, the more expensive and environmentally damaging 
                                                 
1 Own calculations  
2 The carbon cycle is a term describing how carbon is passing through various spheres of 
the earth; biosphere, pedosphere, geosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere. Some 
spheres are producing carbon, other are absorbing it (sources and sinks) and are, along 
with the water and the nitrogen cycles, sustaining the balance of life on earth.  
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the transition will be (Stern; 2006, p. 2). Moreover, there are even no 
technological obstacles blocking our way for advancing to renewable energy 
sources (Coley; 2011, 3). So how can we make this transition happen faster? 
More specifically which policy tools do politicians have at hand to regulate human 
behaviour to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? 
 
The currently most promising and radical feature of international governance and 
cooperation on the subject of climate change mitigation is the European Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (Grubb; 2008, 2). The EU ETS was launched in 2005 
and is designed to ensure significant cuts in the levels of permitted emissions 
from the sectors of heavy industry, by creating a market based cap-and-trade 
mechanism (detailed explanation below). The scheme covers half of the EU CO2 
emissions and has created a market that is worth tens of billions of euros 
annually (Grubb; 2008, p. 3). The EU ETS has been said to be “the most 
significant outcome of 5 decades of international negotiations about European 
energy and climate affairs” (Wettestad, 2010, p. 5). Being an elegant and 
potentially efficient political tool, the creation of a free emission trading market 
within the EU is no small accomplishment.  
 
However, the brilliant theoretical idea of a carbon market is not necessarily an 
effective emission reduction mechanism in practice. The EU ETS has been widely 
criticized for having many flaws such as over-allocation, windfall profits, price 
volatility, generally failing to meet its goals and even creating perverse incentives 
(Carbon Trade Watch; 2011, Grubb; 2008, Buchan; 2009, Skærseth and 
Wettestad; 2008). All these negative effects are results of the member states 
generally allocating more emission permitting credits to their national industries 
than the actual amount of pollution emitted by these. This over-allocation 
happened in the initial phase (2005-2007) of the three-phased Emission Trading 
Scheme, and has still not been corrected on the verge of the third phase.  
 
This makes me curious about how exactly the EU ETS policy works, and whether 
it is at all effective. It makes me wonder how the emission trading scheme 
initially was decided upon, established and how it evolved. And it makes me very 
interested in how the prospects of its further continuation are. Boiling all these 
questions down to one; to what extent has the EU ETS been effective? 
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Methodology  
 
Method – EU policy analysis  
When trying to understand the policy process of the EU ETS it can be useful to go 
practically about the task, by applying a framework that can help structure the 
process of analysis. For this purpose, I have chosen to conduct a policy analysis. I 
could have chosen to make a discourse analysis or conducted a process tracing 
analysis, but was specifically interested the gradual evolvement of the policy 
process of the EU ETS. But how do we go about making such an analysis of a 
complex policy such as the emission trading scheme made in a multileveled polity 
such as the EU? First of all it can be useful to define what a policy is. Using the 
definition of Versluis et. al. (2010, p. 11) a policy “refers to a deliberate course of 
(in-) action selected from among available alternatives to achieve a certain 
outcome”. In this definition, a policy is more than a single rule or law. It is course 
of action that has the purpose of making something happen (or not happen). So 
what is a policy analysis? A policy analysis defines the problem, the goals that 
should be met for solving this problem and policy able to do this. It scrutinizes 
the implementation of the policy and assesses the actual effect of this compared 
to the goal (Najam, 1995, p. 5). Put in a clear definition, a “policy analysis is a 
process of multidisciplinary inquiry designed to create, critically assess, and 
communicate information that is useful in understanding and improving policies” 
(Dunn, 2004, as in Versluis et. al. 2010, p. 14). A policy analysis is thus not just 
about describing the facts and events surrounding a policy. It is about analysing 
and understanding the reasons why actors act in certain ways and why process 
evolve as they do, by piecing together as much legitimate empirical knowledge as 
possible.  
 
However, policy analysis is marked by limitations and uncertainties, as is any 
mediated, socially produced phenomenon (see below for theory of science). As 
described by Versluis et al., “any answer is merely a well-constructed and 
convincing argument that attempts to solve the question” (p. 18).  It is, however, 
an important part of the social learning and adaptation that help societies 
understand and navigate in the complex relationship between policy tools and 
environmental outcomes: 
 
“Policy analysis is rarely exhaustive and in most cases, cannot be prescriptive. It 
provides baseline information, points out rough linkages between decisions and 
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environmental outcomes, and provides a starting point for consideration of more 
sustainable policy options” (Najam, 1995, 6).  
 
A policy analysis is the key means through which policy decisions are made in 
most levels of government, and is valued by how well the issue and the 
arguments justifying the recommended course of action are presented. Therefore, 
as we must realise that it is not possible to create a complete and objective 
description of events and why they happened, we can strive to be as objective as 
possible when reconstructing the turn of events (Versluis, et al., 2010, p. 18). 
 
When conducting a policy analysis there a several decisions to be made. First of 
all, the choice of framework needs to be made clear. The most commonly applied 
method in policy analysis is the stages-approach. Following the description of 
Versluis et al., “the framework offers a simple way to try to systemize existing 
knowledge by assuming a roughly chronological series of functional, goal-oriented 
stages in which multiple actors perform multiple tasks in hot pursuit of their 
interests, and in accordance with (though not beyond) their own capability 
to act” (p. 22). This approach is a way of breaking down a complex political 
process into smaller and more tangible peaces. One way of dividing the stages 
could be as the one presented below: 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.unep.com 
 
Other stage-categories can be chosen, in order to emphasise different parts of 
the policy process (see mine below). However, when using this framework of 
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‘stages’ you run the risk of oversimplifying the process. By dividing it into fixed 
stages, moving analytically from one stage to another in linear succession, you 
may fail to notice how stages of policy processes can often overlap, change the 
sequence of how they occur or return in the middle of a what was supposed to be 
a new stage. Hereby, it can be useful to think of the policy process, not as 
proceeding in stages but functioning as a set of tiers (as presented above), 
interacting with each other and changing position and size. No matter what the 
divisions in the framework is called, it is important to realise that the reality is 
much more complex and unpredictable than any model can account for. When 
this is said, it can be very useful to have a guiding tool to navigate in this 
complexity.  
 
Problem statement: 
To what extent has the EU ETS been effective? 
 
In this case study on the policy process and effectiveness of the EU ETS, the 
stages-approach will not be used as a way of focusing on one single segment of 
the policy process. Rather, my interest lies in understanding as much as the 
process as possible and hereby gaining a comprehensive (and therefore maybe 
more shallow) insight into the structural functioning and social processes that 
constitutes the EU ETS. Therefore my analysis will proceed in four stages (or 
tiers), which I find to capture crucial aspects of the functioning and the making of 
the emission trading policy. These four stages make up the structure of my paper 
and will be formulated into four guiding research questions. 
 
Research Questions and structure of analysis:  
1) Which problem(s) was the EU ETS made to mitigate?   
2) How was the political process leading up to the adoption of the EU ETS? 
3) How has the EU ETS been implemented and how has it evolved from 2005 
to the present? 
4) Have the EU ETS actually reached the goals that it was made to do?  
 
Elaboration of Research Questions  
For structuring my research in each stage of the policy analysis, I pose sub-
questions, which further focus the research on key elements of each stage.  
 
1) Which problem(s) was the EU ETS made to mitigate?   
• What is the problem to be addressed? 
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• Is it a problem or crisis that demands immediate attention? 
• What is the nature of the problem (social, economic, diplomatic)? 
• What interests are at stake for the actors involved? 
 
2) How was the political process leading up to the adoption of the EU ETS? 
• How can the identified problem be translated into a specific set of goals? 
• What was the event or series of events that was a catalyst for initiating 
the policy? 
• Which actors are involved in the decision-making process and how?  
 
3) How has the EU ETS been implemented and how has it evolved from 2005 to 
the present? 
• Was the ETS implemented according to original design? 
• Have the member states changed or skewed the policy to reflect their 
own interests? 
• Which changes were made from the original design and why are they 
important? 
 
4) Have the EU ETS actually reached the goals that it was made to do?  
• Did the EU ETS achieve its goals? 
• What were the costs and consequences of the policy? 
• Who were the biggest ‘winners’ and biggest ‘losers?’  
• Overall, was the policy a “success” or a “failure”? 
 
The stages-approach does not explicitly give us the answers to why a policy is 
initiated, why it is adopted or why this happens smoothly or not (Versluis, et al., 
2010, p. 23). This analytical touch has to be made by the researcher. Therefore, I 
will put a further perspective into my policy analysis, by making an in-debt 
theoretical analysis of the decision-making process, taking a social constructivist 
approach. More specifically, I will do this by applying the five ‘Argumentative 
Persuasion’ hypotheses, developed by Jeffrey T. Checkel (2001) to analyse how 
the European Commission steered the decision-making process towards the 
policy adoption.  
 
Literature  
This policy analysis of the EU ETS will be founded on primary documents from the 
European Commission, the EEA and the UN, which will give access to well-
founded information about the structure and evolvement of the EU ETS. The most 
relevant sources of information on the policy process of the ETS is that of the 
2000 Green Paper on the ETS, the 2001 Directive proposal, the 2003 ETS 
Directive, the 2008 revised ETS Directive for post-2012 continuation and the 
2008 Impact assessment. Together with the amendment proposals of the 
European Parliament, the Common position of the European Council of Ministers 
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and the stakeholder consultation summaries, these primary documents will make 
solid foundation for assessing the EU ETS. Also, the research will be based on a 
broad review of the prominent academic literature done on the subject of the EU 
ETS, specifically focusing on the three phases of implementation, the decision-
making process and the functioning of the cap-and-trade system (technical 
description follows below). This review will make me able to piece together an 
extract of how prominent theorists understand how the ETS has developed during 
its three phases, how it has been implemented in the MS and which challenges 
that hinders effective implementation and hereby functioning of the ETS.  
 
Theory of science  
This policy analysis will be based on the social constructivist understanding of the 
world, in which the relationship between ontology and epistemology is turned 
upside down. As social constructivism is founded on the idea that knowledge 
about reality always is mediated (epistemology) our knowledge of reality, 
precedes how the world actually is (ontology) (Fugelsang; 2009, 397). That is, 
knowledge cannot be freed from social mediation and is therefore never 
completely objective. Taking this approach is not to say that nothing is real in 
itself, but more to stress that the knowledge we gain as individuals is founded on 
previously processed information, which we, as scientists, must accept that we 
build upon and cannot escape. This is opposed to the positivistic approach, the 
aim of which is to make objectively true, sense-based laws on the existence of 
reality (Fugelsang; 2009, p. 55). An important assumption in the ontological 
approach of social constructivism is that reality is profoundly influenced by our 
realisation of it, which mean that societal phenomenon is created and shaped by 
social processes and can therefore also be altered by human beings (Berger and 
Luckmann, 2008).  
 
The epistemological approach to making a policy analysis based on a social 
constructivist view is primarily to realise that science, as anything else we 
humans do, is a social practise that is marked by uncertainty and is a continuous 
open process of mediation. The basic understanding of the world in this approach 
render a specific scientific method impossible, as social constructivism defies the 
exact thing that such a method is meant to provide, namely certainty and 
universality. Instead, the scientific method of a social constructivist policy 
analysis is reflection about how to narrow down the field of study, which sources 
to use and which arguments should be emphasise in an evaluation (Fugelsang: 
2009, 406).   
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The social constructivist way of understanding what knowledge is can be helpful 
when trying to identify how a policy analysis of the EU ETS can be both valuable 
and scientifically legit. Social constructivism gives a convincing explanation of the 
impossibility of making completely universal and objectively truthful conclusions 
on social matters. Therefore we should not have this as the objective for our 
research. Rather, the aim of the study should be to approximate an 
understanding of reality. This can be done by studying how a mixed crowd of 
public administrators, politicians, journalists and academic scholars, all with 
differing subjective views on how the world (and the EU ETS) does and should 
function and this way build my own understanding of the socially produced 
knowledge about the functioning of the ETS.  
 
Demarcation of the scope of research 
In this section I will introduce the reflections I have done in choosing the subject 
of research. That is, which assumptions and understandings make up the 
analytical basis for formulating and answering the research question?  
 
- Why the EU 
The underlying basis of this research is, as explained in the introduction, the 
question of how to mitigate the problems posed by rising temperatures and 
climate change. This leads to the more specific question of which instruments 
political regulators have at hand to reduce emissions of green house gasses? To 
answer these questions it can be useful to narrow down the focus of the study 
from a planet perspective, to an entity such as the EU, which is both politically 
and technologically relatively advanced in the area of environmental protection 
(Lenshow, 2010, p. 137). The EU has also taken environmental protection as a 
core value of its policies, incorporating it into the basic principles of the 
community aquis, which then has to be thought into new law making. With 
principles such as the ‘Precautionary Principle’, ‘High Level of Protection’, 
‘Correction at the Source’, ‘The Polluter Pays’ and ‘Prevention Principle’ (Article 
191 TFEU), the starting point for environmental protection seems high. Climate 
change was an obvious problem to go to for the EU, as a general consensus 
continuously exists between the MS of the need for this. Not only national 
governments give the EU a climate protection mandate, also EU citizens support 
the EU institutions in this area, with 54% stating that environmental protection is 
a key area for the EU and that ‘the EU should take even more action on this area’ 
and only 4% stating the opposite (Euroborometer, 2001.5). Backed up by its 
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members, the EU has been taking the role as a leading environmental protector 
in global environmental cooperation, arguing for the most ambitious emission 
reduction targets in UN Earth and FCCC3 summits. By studying the problems EU 
has with getting environmental protection to work, we can get an idea of the 
difficulties an environmental frontrunner-system is facing and gain insight into 
how this system can be improved and further propagated. Having already devised 
and well-tested political tools available for regulating greenhouse gas emissions 
on a bigger scale must be a good start for other federations and states that later 
on decide to prioritize sustainability. 
 
- Why the Emission Trading Scheme?   
As explained in the introduction, the EU ETS has been praised as “the new grand 
policy experiment” and the first and the biggest international emission trading 
system in the world, covering 80% of the global emission market in 2006 
(Buchan, 2009, p. 126). Most importantly, the EU ETS is the central pillar of the 
EU climate policy and has big potential for being an effective solution to 
mitigating the climate crisis, as this policy has actually achieved to put a price on 
carbon. 
 
Technical description of the Emission Trading Scheme 
The Emission Trading Scheme was introduced by the 2003 ETS Directive and 
started operating on the 1th of January 2005. It is divided into three distinct 
phases. The first phase ran from 2005 to 2007, the second covers 2008 - 2012, 
in order to coincide with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. A 
third phase will begin in January 2013. In 2008, the EU ETS covered the power 
industry and heavy industry (the latter comprising oil-refineries, cement and 
lime, ceramics and glass, paper and pulp) some 11,000 power stations and 
industrial plants, which make up 51% of the aggregated emissions of the EU, plus 
Norway, Island and Lichtenstein. The EU ETS functions by putting a price on 
carbon emissions/putting a value on emitting less. It runs by the “cap-and-trade” 
principle by which a limit is set to how much green house gas can be emitted 
within a specific time period and an emission trading market is established. 
Heavy industrial emitters are allocated emission allowances, corresponding to less 
than what they normally emit. As any other market, the value of the allowances 
is determined by the limited amount available, which means that the key to 
prices is scarcity. At the end of each year the companies have to hand over the 
                                                 
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
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amount of allowances covering their entire greenhouse gas emission of the year 
and if they do not, they will have to pay costly fines (European Commission 
homepage, Emission Trading System, 2012). The idea is then that if companies 
reduce their emissions they have surplus allowances and can sell them to 
companies emitting more than they are allocated. Hence companies have to pay 
for emitting more and get payment for emitting less. The flexibility of that trading 
mechanism ensures that emissions are cut where it costs the least to do so (ibid). 
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Problems in need for regulation 
 
First step of making a policy analysis is to review the nature of the problems that 
needs to be politically addressed. The following section will hence focus on the 
most evident problems caused by climate changes, the scope of the problems and 
whether the problems demand immediate political attention. Also, the interests at 
stake for the involved actors will be analysed, primarily focusing on the political 
interest at member state and EU level. The section about climatic problems will 
be relatively comprised in that much of the problems and their causes are 
commonly known and accepted. 
 
The most menacing problem of our time must be said to be the climatic changes 
happening due to excessive anthropogenic emissions of green house gasses. The 
temperatures on earth are rising faster than previously experienced, causing 
extreme weather conditions, pressuring agricultural production and human 
habitat and causing a massive loss of biodiversity (this causal line of problems 
will henceforth be referred to as ‘the climate crisis’). Despite declining energy and 
carbon intensity in our technology, CO2 emission has increased by 80% since 
1970 and current emissions (2005) are almost 40% higher than the base year for 
the Kyoto protocol 1990, rising steadily with 3% a year since 2000 (Jackson; 
2011, 70). Moreover, there is consistent evidence for the fact that western 
countries are indirectly responsible for much more green house gas emission than 
they account for, due to their heavy import of goods from third countries (ibid. 
73). Linked to the emission of green house gases is the depletion of fossil fuels, 
which also threatens the way humans have arranged their societies (Coley, 2011, 
p. 1-7).  
 
The specific nature and evolvement of the problems linked to the climate crisis no 
one can predict with certainty. However, the predictions that are made forecast 
far-reaching, potentially fatal problems, covering literally all aspects of the 
political spectrum of concern, as the basic elements of the functioning of the 
member states such as economic growth, energy security and hence national 
security possibly can be put at risk. This way, it is difficult to demarcate the scope 
of the climate crisis to a specific sector of political area. However, these are 
possible problems connected to a long-term perspective (Coley, 2011, p. 79-97).  
 
When looking at the immediate problems politicians at national and EU level are 
faced with if they ignore the climate crisis, the picture becomes more blurred. The 
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effects of our actions in the next 10 years will primarily, but substantially, affect 
the last half of this century and the next. How the climate changes will evolve in 
the next 40 - 50 years, however, we do not have much influence on now (Stern, 
2006, p. 2). This means that the interests of short-term elected politicians of the 
member states are widely dependent on how much political value their electorate 
find that mitigating climate change have. If voters construct and demand a strong 
‘climate mitigation agenda’ the interests of governments will be shaped by 
different variables, depending on the institutional context, their ethical and 
ideological opinion on the subject, as opposed to how strong the socially 
constructed pressure for mitigating climate change is, both from the side of 
voters and peer politicians (Buchan, 2009, p. 114). These different combinations 
of social and institutional interests have to be weighed against the economic cost 
of combating climate change and how this fit into the budgetary conditions of the 
member states.  
 
Looking at EU citizens’ opinion on climate mitigation, the general trend is a clear 
support for EU action on this area. In 2001, the year of the initial negotiations 
about the EU ETS, 54% of citizens stated that EU should take more action on the 
policy area of protecting the environment and found this to be a key area for the 
EU (Euroborometer, 2001.5). In another Euroborometer opinion poll from the 
beginning of 2008 64% of EU citizens stated that protection of the environment 
was more important than competitiveness. On average from 2001 – 2011 65% of 
citizens believed that policies on environmental protection should be made, not 
on the national level but in cooperation between member states and the EU (ibid; 
2001.5 – 2011). These numbers create great legitimacy to the EU institutions for 
creating ambitious climate change policies.         
 
At EU level, interests in mitigating the climate crisis are strong, as the member 
states share a common understanding of the need for this, environmental 
protection has a strong legal foundation in the treaties and the structural 
European circumstances make the challenge seam manageable (Coley, 2011, p. 
6). The climatic changes will hit hardest in the southern member states with 
droughts and desertification, which means that these states are increasingly 
backing the climate mitigation agenda. Strong member states such as the Nordic 
countries and Germany have long traditions for preventative environmental 
measures, which have influenced EU legislation as well, with incorporation of 
basic environmental protection principles into the community aquis (Chalmers et. 
al.; 2011, p. 896). As mentioned in the demarcation (p. 8), EU creates a good 
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institutional match to the cross-boarder climate crisis and additionally has 
structural advantages to take world leadership in this political agenda. Europeans 
do not have such extensive travelling distances, bad public transportation 
opportunities and harsh weather conditions as in the US, but still have not picked 
all the low hanging fruit of energy savings as the Japanese have (Buchan; 2009, 
p. 113). This gives the EU a strong political, structural and legislative basis for 
taking up the challenge of climate change.  
 
Looking at how pressing the political problem of the climate crisis is, there is 
strong evidence for the fact that immediate and effective action is necessary to 
mitigate the intensification of the climate crisis in the long run and that this can 
be done without major economic costs (Coley; 2011, Daly; 1993, Nielsen; 2012, 
Jackson; 2011) amounting to approximately 1% of the worlds’ GDP (Stern; 2006, 
p. 2). “The scientific evidence is now overwhelming: climate change presents 
very serious global risks, and it demands an urgent global response. (...) The 
benefits of strong and early action considerably outweigh the costs” (Stern, 2006, 
p. 1).   
 
These arguments have to be considered against the economic interests of political 
institutions, businesses and citizens, which are close-knit to the capitalistic 
economic system. A delicate entangled chain of dependent variables makes up 
this system. Put simply, companies employ workers and capital so that they can 
produce the goods and services that households then consume. Profit (growth) 
from this sale is vital to the system, as it makes companies able to pay their 
employees, who spend some of their money on buying products and some on 
savings in banks, and hereby indirectly invest in new businesses, which again 
employ more people (Jespersen, 2009). To this should be added the variables 
connected to international trade, which kicks in the balance of payments and the 
need for high international competitiveness. Keeping the dynamics of this system 
intact so as to get the highest possible employment rates and hereby taxes in the 
national Treasury to provide public services, is the bread and butter of national 
governments within the EU, as this obviously is a necessary priority of concern of 
their electorate, namely citizens and businesses.   
 
Maintenance of these basic economic processes is deeply rooted into the 
institutional setting of governments and does not leave much space for changing 
the way our society work, which is a prerequisite for mitigating climate changes, 
 17
as these are directly linked to the pursuit of growing the worlds’ economies (see 
chart below) (Jackson, 2011, p. 123). 
 
 
Source: Stern, 2006, p. 181 – it should to be noted, that 13% of world energy 
consumption originates from renewable energy (IEA, 2009).  
 
With the entrance of the economic crisis in 2008, banks became reluctant to 
lending, governments indebted trying to save banks, businesses short of money 
and citizens unemployed (Soros, 2009). A severe domino effect shook trough the 
chain of closely interdependent variables of the international economic system, 
shifting the focus of political institutions away from the otherwise promising 
development of international cooperation on climate change that was supposed to 
manifest itself in COP15. Keeping the employment-consumption-growth-engine 
going has been an even more urgent concern for member state governments 
since 2008, supported by a growing number of unemployed citizens and 
economically pressured businesses, making expensive climate change action a 
profligate endeavour (Jackson, 2011, p. 127).  
 18
Goals to be met - Choice of Policy  
 
Having sketched the problems that need to be addressed and the interests of the 
actors that have to regulate the problem, the focus will be put on which policy 
that has been chosen as best fitted to combine the interests and the mitigation of 
the climate problem. The process leading up to the decision of the policy will also 
have to be scrutinized, looking at the specific events and actors that were 
catalysts for adopting the policy. 
 
The key cause of environmental problems is the failure of markets to incorporate 
the cost of environmental damages in the prices of goods and services (Ellermann 
et. al., 2010, p. 2). There is no price signalling that the atmosphere is filling up 
with greenhouse gases and therefore there are no incentives to reduce emissions. 
There are two economical methods to incorporate this price, either by taxation of 
each unit of emission/energy or the emission trading mechanism (Buchan, 2009, 
p. 117). The Commission initially put forward the taxation method in 1997, 
proposing a differentiated tax on all sources of energy, as to promote the 
renewable sources. This method was extensively debated and opposed by many 
member states and businesses within the EU (Wettested, 2005, p. 5). When the 
emission trading method was proposed, however, it generally received a warm 
welcome.  
 
The legislative procedure of creating the ETS directive of 2003 have been 
described as being unusually swift, seen in the light of the very complex nature of 
the emission trading mechanism (Matti and Zapfel, 2002, p. 12). The first Green 
Paper on the subject was published by the Commission in February 2000 
(08/02/2000 - COM(2000) 87), and was already decided upon and published in 
2003, to be implemented in 2005. Comparing this to the long diplomatic struggle 
of the all in all 6 years it took to decide upon the Energy Tax Directive (1997-
2003, initial negotiations starting in 1990!), this seams fast. So which factors 
triggered this decision to create an emission trading scheme in the EU?  
 
When the US firstly introduced the instrument of emission trading in the run-up 
to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the EU was very reluctant towards this (Skjærseth 
and Wettestad, 2010, p. 1). However, in the years leading up to the 2000 Green 
Paper on the EU ETS, a number of factors contributed to the EU going from being 
an emission trading sceptic to becoming a pioneer on the field. First of all, the EU 
was already lagging behind their Kyoto commitments of 1997, having been 
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ineffective in deciding upon and implementing sufficiently comprehensive 
environmental policies in the area of air pollution (Buchan, 2009, 116). The 
primary Kyoto-obligation was to make an 8% reduction in emission in 2012 
compared to 1990. The conflict-ridden deliberation period on establishing an 
energy tax within the union was effectively impeded by heavy lobbying of 
industries and governments, which criticized the tool for being too centralized and 
intervening. This resulted in a much-reduced taxation plan that, combined with 
other limited environmental protection initiatives, for example focusing 
specifically on water, caused the EU to have “post-Kyoto hangovers” (Wettestad, 
2005, p. 4), that could only diminish with a new and strong policy to meet the 
CO2 reduction goals in time for 2012.  
 
Another important factor leading to the adoption of the ETS was the exit of the 
US in the Kyoto agreement. This cleared the way for EU to take upon itself the 
role as the leading actor in international cooperation in climate change (Matti and 
Zapfel, 2002, p. 3). Realizing the responsibility of being the primary force behind 
the ratification the to Kyoto Protocol, which was to be renegotiated in 2002, the 
EU wanted to set an example by using all tools available to meet their 
international commitments, the sooner the better (COM/2000/0087, p. 1).  
 
These factors made the Commission advocate for an emission trading scheme 
that could be a more flexible and market-based solution for meeting reduction 
goals, that could relieve the big reliance on the restricted energy tax. So after the 
Commission had internalised this idea, how did it then go in the decision making 
process? Referring to article 175(1) of the European Community treaty, the 
legislative procedure was a co-decision procedure, entailing qualified majority 
voting in the Council and the Parliament (TEC, C 321 E/124). This made the 
deliberation process far smoother than that of the energy taxation proposal, 
which was a fiscal matter, requiring a unanimous opinion in the Council.  
 
However, the most important factor of the quick decision-making process has 
been argued to be the role played by the Commission (Sjærseth and Wettestad; 
2010, Wettestad; 2005, Braun; 2009, Matti and Zapfel; 2002). It seems as 
though all the necessary conditions for the Commission to take the lead when 
negotiating with the member states was present in the case of the legislative 
process establishing the ETS. The Commission has the upper hand when a 
proposal is complex, untested and when there is disagreement amongst member 
states, as these factors make it difficult for the Council or the European 
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Parliament to make a strong case against a proposal (Moravcsik, 1999). Apart 
from Denmark and the UK, the member states were inexperienced with this kind 
of relatively complex mechanism and the two strong member states that 
primarily demanded fundamental amendments (UK and Germany) disagreed 
about these (Wettestad, 2005, p. 10). The Commission also made the smart 
move of downplaying the discussion on the topic of the size and nature of the 
national caps and instead focused the discussion on the subject of the less 
controversial allocation method, which also made the deliberation easier, as this 
was more superficial (ibid, p. 5). Generally, the Commission made a strong case 
in its 2001 Green paper, presenting a clear and persuasive line of arguments, 
leaving room for involving member states in important parts of the market-
design. A key goal stressed in the Green Paper was to prepare the EU for the 
Kyoto trading system that would be established in 2008. Having an initial phase 
of ‘learning-by-doing’ was argued to give the EU an advantage of learning 
valuable lessons before the entry into force of the Kyoto emission trading 
(COM/2000/0087, p. 1). A part of the rationale behind this was surly to create a 
leading position in the research and development of energy efficient and low-
carbon technology that could bring a competitive advantage, as the global 
emission trading market could very well increase demands for just this. Also the 
Commission argued for the favourability of establishing a single coordinated 
emission-market within the EU, instead of 27 different schemes across member 
states, as a bigger market is a more cost-effective one. This must have appealed 
to both industry and member states.  
 
In the process of legislative decision making within the EU, lobbyists play an 
important role in linking the EU institutions to the EU citizens (Cini and Borragán, 
2012, p. 190). In the 2001 stakeholder consultancy meeting about the ETS, 
industry and environmental NGOs demonstrated an “overwhelming” support for 
going ahead with emission trading, “sooner rather than later”. In the summary of 
the meeting, the chairman writes:     
 
“Everyone accepts that emission trading would offer a desirable additional 
instrument for achieving reductions in emissions of green house gases fulfilling 
the EU’s international commitments” (European Commission, ENV.E.1, 2001, p. 
3). 
 
This demonstration of goodwill from the side of the heavy industries about to be 
imposed an extra cost for pollution, must be said to be unusual. However, seen in 
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the light of the earlier negotiated Kyoto agreement, which portended an entrance 
of global emission trading in 2008, probably made industries keen on gaining 
experience on the field and hence set the rules of the game. The idea of working 
together within the EU probably also seemed more attractive than separate 
domestic schemes, as there is a certain economic safety in numbers. Being part 
of a union of 27 countries, with a union-wide market of 500 million people, makes 
the threat of loss of competitiveness considerably smaller. Most of the power and 
heavy industries have inter-EU trade, which then divide the costs of emission 
reduction on all the countries (Buchan, 2009, p. 114). Furthermore, the 
Commissions demonstrated a combination of economic efficiency and 
environmental goals, with the argument of lessening pollution in the most cost-
effective way, which is perceived as being more ‘fair’ than the widely opposed 
energy tax. 
 
Looking at how the final directive of 2003 ended up as opposed to the 
Commission proposal of 2001 and the Green Paper of 2000, there has been 
implemented few amendments in the deliberation process, and surprisingly, a 
more ambitious version of the proposal was decided upon on the subject of sector 
participation. A flexible possibility of member states opting-in sectors into the 
scheme was proposed in the Green Paper (COM/2000/0087, p. 15). Paradoxically, 
the main preoccupation of involved industries was to preserve a ‘level playing 
field’, so even though a voluntary approach was advocated by many industry 
lobbyist, the mandatory participation was overall favoured by these (European 
Commission, ENV.E.1, 2001, p. 2).  
 
Probably the most important factor that contributed to the fast diplomatic process 
was that a mutual understanding within the EU of the need for finding a new way 
of reaching the Kyoto goals, and hereby leading by example in the international 
environmental negotiations. Such simple facts as the lack of alternatives to the 
emission trading mechanism, and the recognition of the mechanism as being a 
fitting tool in the very internal market focused union, made member states, 
lobbyists and the three EU institutions favourably disposed towards the idea of an 
emission trading system.  
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Evolvement of the Implementation of the EU ETS 
In this section the implementation of the EU ETS will be studied, looking at the 
evolvement of the three-phased implementation, specifically checking if the policy 
was implemented according to the original plan, or if it has been skewed by 
member states to reflect their own interests. In particular also scrutinizing the 
effectiveness, efficiency and the distributional consequences of the design of the 
scheme.   
 
In relation to the 2003 ETS directive, the Commission issued a communication in 
December 2004 on the implementation process in the member states (EC No 
2216/2004). Together with the criteria for the completing the National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs) already put forth in the 2003 Directive, the cornerstones for the ETS 
was formed and the member states could start the process of transposing the law 
of the directive, drawing up the NAPs and establishing the necessary practical 
conditions for the implementation process.   
 
2005 - 2007 
The member states needed to set up national registries of allowances and 
institutional monitoring and guidance of industries. The crucial part of the 
implementation process, however, was setting national caps on emissions, which 
was the central purpose of the NAPs (COM (2008) 16 final, p. 16). The emission 
trading market does not, as normal functioning markets, depend and the 
common price acceptance between buyer and seller. The amount of allowances 
available initially depended directly on governments’ own calculations on 
allocation, drawing on historical data on previous sector emissions (Betz and 
Sato, 2006, p. 1). In an attempt to make the ETS a flexible, decentralised 
political instrument, the role of the Commission was limited to being a watchdog 
of the NAPs, which it could not effectively do, without proper historical data on 
emission from individual installations that most MS did not even have (EEA, 2008, 
p. 5). The NAPs turned out to be quite different in their allocation approach, 
definition of what a combustion plant at all is and their level of environmental 
ambitiousness, pointing to the need for further harmonisation in the next phase 
(COM (2008) 16 final, p 14). 
 
The environmental ambitiousness of member states turned out to be generally 
very low. The first publication to review the emission data after the launch of the 
ETS showed that MS had been overly generous with the allowances granted to 
their heavy industry polluters, basing the national allocation plans on the highest 
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possible emission-rate (or even higher) and hence taking the lowest risk of 
decreasing national competitiveness (Buchan, 2009, p. 116). Giving the member 
states the discretion to allocate made democratically short-term elected 
politicians choose between taking responsibility for the long-term consequences 
of abstract global warming at the expense of the concrete, highly voter-valued 
national accounting (Broholm et al., 2010, p. 22-29). Politicians were placed in a 
typical prisoner dilemma, which they so often are in multilateral environmental 
agreements4. Consequently, almost all member states were overly optimistic in 
their projection of future emission, except only the UK (COM (2008) 16 final, p. 
16). The Commission did, however, manage to decrease the average cap with 
about 290 million tonnes of CO2. This merely amount to 4.5 % of the total 
number of allowances, which must be said to be a small share. The insufficient 
historical data loosely interpreted by tactical politicians combined with a hot 
winter in the year 2005 resulted in a 4% surplus of allowances of the first year of 
the ETS, compared to the actual amount of CO2 emissions of that year (EEA, 
2008, p. 3).  
 
The overly generous allocations of the first phase of the ETS (2005-2007) made 
nonsense of the cap-and-trade mechanism, which was dependent on the cap 
actually being a cut in emissions. When emitters was informed about the fact that 
the carbon market was flooded with allowances, their incentive to reduce 
emissions was undermined, which presented itself as a steep decline in prices of 
allowances to virtually zero, which never really recovered (Buchan, 2009, p. 116)  
 
Another important factor that influenced the allowance prices in the first phase of 
the ETS was uncertainty about political continuation of the scheme, as there was 
an absence of commitment to post-2012 continuation. This posed a big threat to 
the entire emission system, as it undermined the investment incentives of 
companies and entrepreneurs (Grubb, 2008, p. 17). Due to political uncertainties 
about the development of environmental research discoveries, technological 
advancements and lack of political commitment the ETS was planned in three 
phases. The third one was planned to start in 2013, but was initially not legally 
                                                 
4 ‘The prisoners’ dilemma’: A group of fellow criminals are imprisoned and are placed in the dilemma 
of knowing that if the optimal outcome of getting everybody released by collective denial of the crime 
is not achieved, then the next best thing is to be the fist to ‘bag-stab’ the fellow prisoners. The same 
goes for political cooperation on climate change: the next best thing to achieving collective action is to 
be the first one to cheat.  
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binding. This has created a multi-period expiring date of the allowances, creating 
much uncertainty about future costs for companies, undermining investments in 
low-carbon production (ibid, p. 18).  
 
Important to the functioning of the ETS is also the design of the way industries 
are allocated allowances. In the trial phase of 2005 – 2007, member states 
handed out all of the allowances for free, to first establish the emission market, 
but with the intention of introducing allocation by auctioning in the second phase 
(Revised Directive 2003/87/EC, p. 13). The handing out of free allowance 
combined with the uncertainty of future policies and prices created so called 
“perverse incentives”, encouraging companies to make more carbon-intensive 
investments than before the ETS (Buchan, 2009, p. 115). However, emission 
data from the first phase of the ETS shows that industries generally did not act on 
this perverse incentive (Ellermann et. al., 2010, p. 13).    
 
Another malfunction of the system, as opposed to the original intention of this, 
was that the free allocation of emission allowances actually resulted in windfall 
profits for the heavy emitting industries. Companies operating in reasonably 
competitive markets work towards maximizing their profit by setting the price of 
their product relative to the marginal cost of production, which include the costs 
of CO2 allowances, even though allowances are handed out for free. The effect of 
this is that consumer will pay for a possible “double compensation” of companies, 
who in turn will profit much now, at the expense of long-term erosion of global 
competitiveness (Grubb, 19, 2008). This expected loss of long-term 
competitiveness has, however, not been found to be a problem for the energy-
producing industries in the EU, in that the longer the transportation of energy the 
higher the transmission loss, giving the energy producers on other continents just 
as high a cost of energy as the double compensated European producers 
(Ellermann et. al.; 2012, p. 18). So the implementation failure of over-allocation 
created a general win-win situation for the heavy emitting industries in the first 
phase of the ETS.   
 
 
2008 – 2012 
The structure of the second phase was the same as the first one, as amendment 
of the basic structures of the system was planned to be renegotiated in 2008 and 
implemented first in 2013 (European Commission homepage, 2008, Q&A, Q;3) In 
the second phase though, the Commission was much tougher on the 
 25
governments of member states in the assessment of for the NAPs, being able to 
draw on emission data and experience from the first phase. Trying to correct the 
two main problems of the first phase, the Commission gained a stronger role in 
the creation of the NAPS and expanded the amount of possible auctioned 
allowances (Buchan, 2009, p. 113). The latter improvement attempt made it 
possible for member states to auction 10% of the allowances instead of giving 
them all out for free and hereby somewhat restrain the creation of windfall profits 
gained by emitters. This option, however, was not well received in the member 
states, resulting in nothing more than 1.5% of allowances actually being 
auctioned (ibid, 116). The other improvement attempt was marginally more 
successful though. Combining the knowledge of the level of CO2 emission from 
the first phase with the estimated growth rates in GDP, made possible a more 
active role of the Commission in finding the appropriate national caps and 
amending NAPs accordingly (COM (2005) 703 final, p. 5). Actually abating 
emissions in this phase was crucial, as the Kyoto goal of reducing the 1990 
emission level by 8% would commence in 2012. The NAPs for the 2008-2012 
period assessed by the Commission, however, showed little sign that member 
states had become more ambitious in order to reach their goals, as the first 17 
notified NAPs on an average had a ‘cap’ of 15% above 2005 emission levels 
(Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009, p. 115). Except for the ambitious caps of 
Denmark, France, Slovenia and the UK, the Commission in average downscaled 
the caps of member states by 10.5%, which placed the average EU cap 6.5% 
below 2005 emission levels, which most likely will result in the EU managing the 
8% in time for the assessment of the 2012 Kyoto goals (ibid.).  
 
Another strengthening of the scheme was that the agreement for phase two 
included two other kinds of greenhouse gases besides CO2, namely nitrous oxide 
and perfluorcarbon. But more importantly, in the 2008-2012 phase the ‘Linking 
Directive’ was also introduced, giving participants of the EU ETS the possibility of 
using the carbon credits from emission trade mechanisms established under the 
Kyoto Protocol, namely the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ (CDM) and ‘Joint 
Implementation’ (JI) (Revised Directive 2003/87/EC). These to mechanisms 
establish a very flexible way of lowering pollution on a global scale, as countries 
can pay off their emission reductions by paying for low-carbon industry in third 
countries with the CDM, and join forces in reducing shared emissions in several 
countries using JI credits. This linkage between the EU ETS and the Kyoto 
Protocol consolidates the obligations of member states from both programs, 
giving them the option of reach their 2020 goal of the ETS with as high as 50% 
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reduction deriving from CDM and JI credits (European Commission, International 
Carbon Market, 2012). As good as this sounds, the actual effect of these 
mechanisms can be discussed. These credits is projected to be much cheaper 
than EU ETS allowances, as making low-carbon projects in third countries 
generates a higher risks as well as a lower abatement cost. These cheaper credits 
can pressure the price on ETS allowances and concurrently reduce actual 
emission abatement within the EU boarders (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009, p. 
116).     
 
2013 – 2020  
At the beginning of the third phase (2013-2020) a surplus of allowances is still 
flooding the carbon-market amounting to 2 billion surplus allowances (European 
Commission, International Carbon Market, 2012).  Combined with the economic 
crisis, which further increases the gap between the amount of allowances and 
actual emission due to lower production than expected, the price of carbon is 
chronically too low, delaying companies’ investment in renewable or energy 
efficient technology. 
 
The proposal for a revised ETS Directive published by the Commission in 
December 2008, drafted a plan for post-2012 continuation commitments and 
flaw-amendments. This Directive was extraordinarily agreed upon on a single 
reading by the Council and the European Parliament, once again signalling that 
the political will behind making the ETS work was great (Buchan, 2009, p. 118). 
The main goal of the Commission for this agreement was to correct the two 
primary flaws of the implementation of the fist phase; letting the national 
governments decide the amount of allowances allocated to their own industries 
and handing out too many allowances for free (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009, 
p. 116). In the negotiations the Commission achieved its goal of centralizing the 
allocation more than previously by crating a EU-wide cap on allowances instead 
letting member states make individual reduction-targets. This overall cap will 
enter into force in 2013 entailing that 21% of the allowances given out in 2005 
continuously will be taken out of the market up to 2020 (Revised Directive 
2003/87/EC, p. 14). The other goal, however, the Commission only partially 
succeeded in, making auctioning a major allocation method, but having to accept 
50% of allocation being free in 2013 (Buchan; 2009, p. 119).  
 
The aim of the Commission in this area was to make the allocation of allowances 
for the heavy emitters of the power industry completely based on auctioning from 
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2013, and the rest of the industries by 2020 (ibid, p. 119). This, however, the 
Commission could not get through with, even though auctioning would replace 
the bureaucratic distribution of national governments, with an elegant market 
solution. This means that industries can still collect windfall profits from 
costumers for allowances given out to them for free. This sustains the 
environmentally counter-productive ‘perverse incentives’ described above, by 
which industries earn money on polluting more. Even still, governments did not 
favour auctioning above short-term relief from lobbyist-pressure from national 
industries (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2011, 5). Industries and member 
states feared the possibility of loss of competitiveness from the extra cost of 
auctioning. The economic downturn of 2008 surely did not help heightening the 
level of climate ambitiousness of the member states, compared to their concern 
for promoting national industries. The agreement instead landed on a plan for 
other industries than power to be based 20% on auctioning in 2013, 70% in 2020 
and 100% first in 2027 (Revised Directive 2003/87/EC, p. 14). On a very positive 
side, the aviation sector was also included in the scheme from 2013, which will 
mean an increase in demand for allowances of about 10–12 million tonnes of CO2 
per year in phase two (DG Climate Action, February, 2012). 
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Concluding analysis - Effectiveness of Policy  
In this section, the effectiveness of the policy of the EU ETS will be assessed. This 
will be done by checking whether the goals of the policy have yet been met, and 
for which costs and consequences. It will also be assessed who have benefited 
the most and the least of the EU ETS policy, leading up to a discussion about 
whether the policy overall has been a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ and how effective 
continuation is secured.  
 
The performance of the EU ETS cannot be evaluated without realising that the 
first phase (2005-2007) of the three-phased scheme was actually a trial period 
and understanding what this trial period was meant to achieve. The goal for this 
phase was to prepare the EU for the first commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol entering into force in 2008, and hence the intention with the trial phase 
was to establish the structural foundation for allocation, trading, monitoring, 
reporting, and verifying emission credits in the member states (COM(2008) 16 
final, p. 13). Seen from this perspective, the goal for the first phase has definitely 
been accomplished. This valuation is backed up by an MIT assessment of the first 
phase: 
   
“In light of the speed with which the program was developed, the many 
sovereign countries involved, the need to develop the necessary data, 
information dissemination, compliance and market institutions, and the lack of 
extensive experience with emissions trading in Europe, we think that the system 
has performed surprisingly well” (Ellermann and Joscow, 2008, p. 8).   
 
Without the establishment of the EU ETS in 2005, the industries of the EU would 
have been in a comparatively worse competition situation. They have gained 
valuable experience both technically and perception-wise and the infrastructure of 
the emission market given them comparative advantages to other new emission 
trading entrants. Having specialised in renewable and low-carbon energy, a 
company can gain profit on selling allowances to bigger polluters. The cost for the 
industries has overall been limited, in that they were actually given credits out for 
free, which not even represented a cap, in order for them to gain business 
advantages.  
 
The Commission itself asses the two first phases as having been “successfully 
carried out” as the assessment report stresses the fact that an entirely new 
market for allowances has been made a part of the infrastructure of public 
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institutions and heavy emitting industries, making the market foundation “sound 
and reliable” (COM(2008) 16 final, p. 13). Furthermore, the Kyoto goal of 
reducing emissions by 8% below 1990 levels by 2012 is almost certainly going to 
be met. In 2008 the scheme covered 10.500 installations, which represent 40% 
of entire greenhouse gas emissions within the EU, making a strong structural 
foundation for possible further emission reductions (Buchan, 2009, p. 120).  
 
Looking at the more negative sides of the functioning of the EU ETS in the first 
two phases, the main flaw of the implementation process have been the over-
allocation of almost all member states to their own industries. Since the main 
point of the cap-and-trade system is the cap actually being a scarcity of 
allowances, this definitely undermines environmental effect of the ETS, and 
hereby the successfulness of the entire emission trading system. The surplus of 
allowances has lead to a crash of prices of emission in 2006, which have been low 
ever since, also much affected by the dynamics of the economic crisis. 
Furthermore, the differing national caps have made distortions in competitiveness 
between national ETS-industries. Another factor that undermines the 
environmental benefit, and even reverses this, is the method of free allocation of 
allowances. Companies pass on the market cost of the allowances to customers 
who then get to pay for something that companies get for free. The damage of 
this is not just the unfairness of the windfall profits for heavy emitting companies, 
but can potentially be counter-productive for the environment, in that companies 
have reverse incentives related to change their production method from carbon-
intensive to low-carbon technologies. They simply earn more money on polluting 
more. This is a very negative flaw of the policy, but was actually anticipated by 
the Commission (Buchan, 2009, 119). If the Commission had proposed a system-
design in which the member states did not have discretion on deciding upon a 
cap themselves and in which allocations had to be bought by industry from the 
beginning, the chances are high that the policy would not even have been 
decided upon, or at least would have been dragged trough a long negotiation 
process, with member states and industry lobbyist being more on guard against 
the proposal.  
 
If such a political blocking of the EU ETS had happened, consequences could 
possibly have been catastrophic, seeing it in the light of the, at that time, resent 
exit of the US from the Kyoto Protocol. Had the EU not been able to take the lead 
in the negotiation by showing responsibility, ambitiousness and strong decision-
making capacity, the global commitment to the Kyoto targets could have lost 
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more legitimacy than it could bear.  
 
Focusing on the plan for the 2013-2020 phase, the flaws of the first phase have 
been quite effectively mitigated in the revised ETS directive of 2008. As member 
states realized the ineffectiveness of the ETS and businesses complained about 
an uneven playing field, they handed over the competences of uniting the caps to 
the Commission. In this way, an EU-wide reduction plan will take out allowances 
equivalent to some 1.700 – 1.800 million tones of CO2 each year covering a 20% 
emission cut in 1990 levels in year 2020 (Revised Directive 2008/101/EC). As 
earlier explained, a plan to increase auctioning of allowances has also been made. 
This has not turned out to be as ambitious as the Commission initially suggested, 
which would not have been realistic either with the newly formulated prominent 
discourse on ‘carbon leakage’ (see below). However, the big increase in the 
amount of allowance-auctions was still a much-needed improvement of the 
policy.   
 
In an assessment of who are the benefactors and the losers in process of 
establishing a price on carbon, the immediate taught is that the heavy emitting 
industries are the losers, as the policy is directed at getting them to change their 
means of production. This, however, can be questioned when looking at the 
above-described effects of the initial design of the policy; the preparatory period 
before the establishment of the Kyoto emission market, free allocation of 
allowances, surplus allowances, low carbon-prices and windfall-profits. These 
factors have helped the EU industries covered by the scheme with creating 
trading-experience and hereby business advantages almost only for the cost of 
extra administrative work on the monitoring, trading and reporting tasks. This 
have to bee analyzed against the perceived threat of the term ‘carbon leakage’, 
which entails the idea that carbon constraints leads to loss of market shares and 
hereby loss of jobs to third countries who then just ‘use’ the carbon saved in 
Europe, or even more (European Commission, 2012, homepage, carbon leakage). 
This threat seems very scary and prejudicial, and it is. But it has been used by 
lobbyists to pressure decision-makers for a smaller cap in a way that seems to 
over-exaggerate the problem (Buchan, 2009, p. 130). Just look at the windfall 
profits earned in relation to the EU ETS. Had companies found that their business 
was threatened by non-EU rivals, windfall profits would not even have been a 
problem, as companies would not dare reflect a cost that they did not actually 
have in the price of their product, in fear of loosing customers. Furthermore, 90% 
of EU businesses covered by the EU ETS are primarily trading their goods inside 
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of the union, which limits the eventual scope of the carbon-leakage effect 
(Corporate Europe Observatory, 2011, p. 8).  
 
Therefore, the biggest losers seem to be the customers of power and products 
produced by carbon-intensive industries. Prices have been projected to rise with 
as much as 15-19 % by 2020 (Commission Impact Assessment, SEC/2008/85/3, 
p. 16). This could lead to some degree of ‘power-poverty’, where such a 
necessary commodity as electricity can pressure the economic situation of less 
moneyed families, even more than the economic crisis is already doing. 
Heightening the prices on emitting carbon, however, has been the intended effect 
right from the beginning, making the ‘polluter pay’. This way, consumers will 
naturally think more about how they use energy and go around carbon-intensive 
products, which will then pressured producers to save energy and use best 
available technology.  
 
All in all, the EU ETS can be argued to be a policy-success. The overall goal of the 
EU ETS has been to facilitate cooperation between the 27 EU member states on 
limiting their greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way, and in a quantity 
that corresponds to their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. In this goal is also 
the wish to fight rising temperatures and climate change, by putting a price on 
greenhouse gasses and hereby lead by example by proving that this option 
actually is possible on a big scale.  
 
Even though there have been many ‘beginners mistakes’, the policy has fulfilled 
the goals it has been made to do. The complex infrastructure of the emission 
trading market has been established in time for (almost certainly) reaching the 
8% reduction goal and for preparing the EU countries for the global emission 
trading market. Policy-corrections have also been made to reach the 20% 
reduction goal by 2020. The direct effect of the EU ETS on climate developments 
is hard to measure. However, the simple fact that the EU as the third most 
emitting polity in the world is taking upon itself to be a responsible frontrunner in 
the global cooperation on climate change mitigation, much increases the 
legitimacy and hereby momentum of this cooperation. The global cooperation 
under the UNFCCC is crucial for keeping temperatures under control, as the 
countries involved cover over 80% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission 
(Fourth assessment report, UNFCCC, 2011, p. 11). Even though outcomes of the 
COP-negotiations are less significant than what is necessary, the firm 
establishment of the emission trading market within the EU at least makes it 
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technically easy to reach an eventual increased emission reduction target in a 
cost-effective way.   
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The Social Construction of the EU ETS   
In this section I will focus on the decision-making process of the EU ETS policy, in 
order to gain a better understanding of why the EU went from being an emission 
trading sceptic to becoming a pioneer in the area. Furthermore, I will look at why 
this process went so relatively smooth considering the scale and consequences of 
establishing an emission trading market. To do this, I will use the theoretical 
framework of social constructivism, specifically applying the analytical hypotheses 
of ‘argumentative persuasion’ developed by Jeffery T. Checkel (2001). This can 
help me gain some micro-level insights into how and why political negotiators 
from EU member states and non-state actors were convinced to comply with the 
Commissions proposal on a complex and comprehensive system for combating 
climate change.    
 
Short description of the theory of ‘argumentative persuasion’ 
Checkels’ point of departure is to find out why agents comply with the norms 
embedded in regimes and international institutions (Checkel, 2001, p. 553). To 
do this he focuses on the role of argumentative persuasion and social learning, 
and builds a framework for understanding social choice in which he combines the 
theoretical explanations of rationalists and constructivists. The former explains 
state compliance as being a function of “coercion (sometimes), instrumental 
calculation (always), and incentives - usually material, but possibly social as 
well”, as they see preferences as being set, in that they are always focused on 
maximising individual gain (Checkel, 2001, p. 559). The choice is based on 
cost/benefit calculations and the social environment is based on strategic 
interaction. In the predominant constructivist approach, the explanation of state 
compliance has remarkable resemblance to that of the rationalist in that 
“compliance is a function of coercion (social sanctioning) and instrumental 
calculations (strategic social construction)” (ibid). A smaller group of 
constructivists finds that “state compliance results from social learning and 
deliberation that lead to preference change. In this view, the choice mechanism is 
noninstrumental, and the environment (…) is one of social interaction between 
agents, where mutual learning and the discovery of new preferences replace 
unilateral calculation” (ibid. p. 560). This constructivist approach, however, most 
often explains social learning, social norms and socialisation from the end point, 
where socially shaped interests have already been internalised in individuals and 
result in social action, but without explaining what happens ‘between the 
earlobes’ in a social interaction of argumentative persuasion (ibid, p. 562). This is 
was Checkel wants to zoom in on.  
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He defines argumentative persuasion as “a social process of interaction that 
involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt 
coercion” (ibid, p. 562). The aims of Checkels paper are to 1) bridge the 
explanations of state compliance of rationalists and constructivists, as he finds 
that interests are being shaped through a combination of the two approaches, 
and 2) to make an analytical framework for understanding the micro-mechanism 
of the argumentative persuasion that makes states comply. For this purpose he 
presents 5 hypotheses5 of for the conditions under which agents are specifically 
open towards being argumentatively persuaded, hereby changing preferences 
and complying with norms in international institutions (ibid, p. 654). Whit these I 
will analyse why member state representatives were so willing to adopt the 
emission trading policy.  
 
As described earlier (see section on policy choice), the decision-making process 
leading up to the adoption of the 2003 Directive on the EU ETS was one of 
extraordinary consensus, minimal amendments and hence a speedy policy 
adoption. However, the initial general opinion of member states was one of 
reluctance, and key players such as Germany and France were in opposition. So 
how did the Commission manage to persuade member states? Comparing the 
hypotheses below with the empirical findings made on the subject of the decision-
making process of the EU ETS, these are remarkably consistent. As have been 
studied by Wettestad and Skjærseth (2010)6 in yet another of their papers on the 
EU ETS, the Commission played a strong and decisive role in leading the research 
behind the system, creating support among the involved actors before the official 
negotiations and in steering the formal deliberative process. I will look at the 
smaller elements of action that make up this leadership-role and hereby the 
social conditions under which decision-making actors were persuaded to change 
interests and adopt the policy. For this I will apply the 5 hypotheses as points of 
focus in the three-year process of getting the idea of the EU ETS incorporated 
into actual EU law.  
  
Hypothesis 1: Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the 
persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment - generated by the newness of 
                                                 
5 “(T)he validity of these deductions is greatly enhanced by the degree to which they overlap with the 
results of laboratory experimental work conducted by other social psychologists. In repeated, large-
scale experiments, this research shows that discussion and persuasion within small groups 
consistently promote feelings of group identity” (Checkel, 2001, p. 663). 
6 I will primarily draw on this article for factual findings. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, I will 
only make references when referring to other sources. 
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the issue, a crisis, or serious policy failure – and thus cognitively motivated to 
analyse new information.  
 
The conditions under which the EU ETS was even thought of, was one generated 
by serious policy failure. The energy/carbon tax that was supposed be the 
primary climate change policy in the EU met unrelenting resistance from industry 
lobbyists and key member states, which dragged on the negotiation for many 
years. The initial preparatory steps were taken in 1990 and the Directive was 
finally decided upon in 2003, having been decisively watered down. This way, the 
EU had a major policy gap for a tool to take care of the emission reductions 
commitments decided under the Kyoto Protocol. This policy failure made the 
Commission open for considering new policy options, which then must have 
loosened up the initial opposition towards the emission trading tool. The first sign 
of consideration on the topic of the emission trading is to be found in a 
communication from the Commission in 1998, which mentions that the EU could 
possibly use this tool in their post-Kyoto strategy (European Commission, 1998, 
p. 20). This, however, was merely a remark, making the first sign of serious 
consideration the Green Paper issued in 2000.  
 
In 2001 the leading power and emitter in the world, namely the US, suddenly left 
the Kyoto Protocol agreement, which in itself must have been seen as a crisis, but 
which also must have made the climate crisis all the more threatening. Following 
hypothesis 1, this made the conditions for argumentative persuasion all the more 
manageable. Looking at the actual negotiations officially starting in the first 
reading by the European Parliament in fall 2002, the issue of creating an emission 
trading market was quite new to member state negotiators in comparison to the 
Commission. In the period between 1998-2001, the Commission did extensive 
research on different models of emission trading, giving it a two years lead in 
front of member states, who first in 2000 became aware of the actuality of the 
ETS proposal. These factors prime the condition, under which member state 
representatives were negotiating, for argumentative persuasion, as the issue was 
one of newness.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the 
persuadee has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the 
persuader’s message.  
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The preparatory interval the Commission had for gaining knowledge, evaluating 
system design and shaping preferences about the emission trading system seems 
to have been an important factor for steering the decision-making process. The 
complexity of the cap-and-trade mechanism also makes it very plausible, that 
member states did not have the time or the means to develop a complete and 
confident knowledge base on the subject. The rather abrupt change in the 
attitude of the Commission, from one of reluctance to one of enthusiastic 
advocacy, may also have confused member state representatives in that they 
possibly did not pay much attention to the tool at firsts and then suddenly had to 
relate to this. These factors could very well result in member state 
representatives having few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the 
persuaders’ message.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the 
persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee 
belongs or wants to belong. 
 
The Commission is the ‘guardian of the treaties’, the legislative initiator and have 
the characteristics of a supranational government of the EU (Cini and Borragán, 
2010, p. 126).  It can be argued that these factors make it the most authoritative 
institution within the entire EU. Looking at the member state representatives 
attitude towards the idea of the EU, it seems as if they are swayed by the grand 
political narrative about solidarity, human rights, peace and cooperation ingrained 
in the treaties and by the strong body of research behind Commission proposals. 
It furthermore seems to be a strong norm steering social interaction among EU-
representatives that there is a common consensus on the need for finding 
compromises in deliberative situations, as to respect and advance the unique 
cooperation between member states. Hence, I argue that national opinions in an 
EU-context are, often just slightly, but almost always downplayed, in order for 
member state representatives to fit in and be a part of the strong union. The 
Commission can hence be argued to be the most authoritative in-group in he EU. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the 
persuader does not lecture or demand but, instead, ‘acts out principles of serious 
deliberative argument’.  
 
In the Green Paper of 2000, the Commission presents several different ways the 
emission market can be designed, it argued for a more centralised way of setting 
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the cap and it argued for auctioning as the main way of allocating allowances, as 
both measures will create less coordination and a more stable cap. It also 
proposed op-in and opt-out possibilities. These measures, however, were up for 
discussion and were presented as the possible options, that member states would 
have to relate to. As we have seen, in the 2001 proposal the Commission have 
listened to arguments from member state representatives, in that the system in 
this directive is presented as decentralised, mandatory and based on free 
allocation. Without having direct information about the actual tone of voice and 
body-language of the Commission representatives who proposed the ETS, it 
seems like the conditions under which the ETS was decided upon was in fact not 
presented in a demanding way. Furthermore, the member states were most likely 
not met with lecturing by the Commission, as the phase of shaping the policy 
deliberately was one of inclusion and learning between the Commission and the 
involved actors (see hypothesis 5).  
 
Also the Commission presented the ETS as having positive effects for all parties. 
For the industry the system was cost-effective and even possibly a way of gaining 
profit by selling excess allowances. For environmental NGOs, the clear win was 
that the ETS, under all circumstances, would establish a cap on the European 
greenhouse gas emissions, which was much better than the outplayed energy 
tax. Member state governments could benefit from both of these effects and 
furthermore badly needed the emission reductions for reaching the Kyoto targets.  
This way, the Commission can be argued to have acted ‘out principles of serious 
deliberative argument’.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the 
persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, 
private settings.  
 
After the issuing of the Green Paper, the Commission initiated consultation 
meetings with member states, the European Parliament and industry lobbyists 
and NGO’s, so as they could be included in the way the actual Directive proposal 
should be shaped before it was made public. These meeting were smaller 
sessions, allowing actors to get more time to speak their opinion and without 
being labelled with an official name such as ‘The first reading’. Besides these 
consultation meetings, a working group was established under the European 
Climate Change Program, and met almost every month a year before the 2001 
Directive proposal. This working group was made up by key stakeholders from 
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industry, NGOs and one member state official from strong and reluctant 
Germany. The purpose of this was to exchange understandings and ideas on the 
design of the emission trading system, but must also have been a means of 
creating less politicized and more insulated, private settings and herby general 
acceptance and consensus. 
 
In this way it can be concluded, that the Commission has been following the 
exact prescription for creating the optimal condition for making decision-makers 
especially open towards being argumentatively persuaded, hereby changing their 
preferences. It can be argued that this is a very positive way of making so many 
actors agree an adopting such a comprehensive scheme, however, some negative 
points have to be made on the method of persuasion.  
 
As we found out above, the authority and grandeur of the EU cooperation can 
sway member state representatives, making them alter their national interests. 
However, when representatives are then faced with the reality of actually getting 
comprehensive agreements implemented in the, often ridged and cost-saving-
affected structures of national institutions, the responsibility they accepted in the 
EU setting is in danger of being skewed and downplayed in member states. This 
way, an ‘implementation gap’ is created, and EU-laws become a cover for 
individual ambitiousness and action in member states. On the other hand, if 
member states representatives are firm in their national interests a ‘legitimacy 
paradox’ may very well occur. This is a paradox between creating legitimacy 
behind the actions of the EU institutions by amending agreements to fit as many 
member states as possible and the actual effectiveness of this agreement. 
Looking at the ETS, most member states advocated for decentralisation of the 
agreement by keeping the discretion over the cap in the national governments, 
which resulted in over-allocation and hereby continued dysfunctional emission 
trading system.  
 
I therefore argue, that this very clash between the grand ambition of securing 
public goods through supranational institutions and the old nation-centred 
traditions embedded in the institutional structures and national identities of 
member states, makes up the essential problem in international deliberative 
democracy’s ability to combat climate changes. 
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